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Abstract 
 
 
Both dividend policy and CEO risk aversion have been subjects of tremendous research over the 
past 30 years. The current gap is how both topics are sporadically considered in tandem. We 
provide a solution to this by analyzing dividend changes in the context of CEO risk-taking 
incentives. Our findings suggest that risk-taking propensity, often overlooked in comparison to 
pay-performance incentives, negatively explains dividend increases. When we account for a 
firm’s cash flow volatility, we see that risk-taking sensitivities carry a positive relationship with 
payout. These findings themselves speak to the belief that much of our current understanding 
regarding dividends must be refocused to encapsulate the effects that CEO characteristics have 
on payout policy. 
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1. Introduction 
In looking at the subject of dividend theory, firm specific factors have been the focus of much 
literature. Examples of this include firm characteristics ranging from earnings (Lang & 
Litzenburger, 1989; Benartazi et al., 1997; Grullon et al., 2002; Grullon et al., 2005) to leverage 
(DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990; Christie, 1994; Bulan & Subramanian, 2008). For obscure reasons 
though, analysis into CEO risk-taking incentive and its link to payout policy has been absent from 
research. This in a time when the work of Murphy (1998) and Hall & Liebman (1998) has 
highlighted a rapid transition in CEO compensation over the past century. This shift saw option 
incentivization becoming more prominent with the goal of aligning managements interests with 
shareholders.  
A worrisome byproduct of this change is that managers are now more risk averse than 
their shareholders (May, 1995; Smith & Stulz, 1985; Tuffano, 1996). The latest solution to set 
problem would be looking at risk-taking incentive. Specifically, in the context of dividend policy.  
Our understanding of dividend literature points to increases in payout representing a long-lasting 
cashflow constraint (Brav et al., 2005). This speaks to an executives’ aversion to cashflow shortfall 
which is a determining factor in dividend payout (Jagannathan et al., 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 
2002; Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2006). It has been documented that CEOs 
prioritize meeting dividend requirements and the implications of not doing so are severe.   
With the threat of cashflow shortfall, management commits to a balancing act. They 
prioritize investing in riskier projects, through their risk-taking incentive, while ensuring that 
dividends remain payable.  Our main finding is that risk-taking incentive has a negative 
explanatory power in determining dividends per share. We can also expand this inverse 
relationship to other aspects of dividend policy. These include dividend increases, dividend 
growth and in comparing dividend payers to nonpayers.  
To explain, both risk-taking and pay-performance sensitivities are proxies developed by 
Core & Guay (1999). They are estimated from option portfolio and stock holdings as disclosed by 
managements compensation disclosure requirements. These tools allow us to quantify the full 
makeup of past and present pay a CEO has received from his company. We can then determine if 
that very same portfolio of wealth tied to the company has an impact on corporate decision 
making. In the context of corporate finance, examples of the influence sensitivities hold are 
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abundant (Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009; Dong et al., 2010; Hagendorff & Vallascas, 2011; Croci & 
Petmezas, 2015; Athanasakou et al., 2016).  Covering topics that range from R&D investment to 
corporate structuring, risk-taking incentive is proven to influence decision making.  
Absent from this literature, however, is the link between CEO compensation, measured in 
the context of risk-taking incentive, and dividend payout. Whereas previous studies have 
examined CEO wealth and payout policy (Rozeff, 1982; Agrawal & Jayaraman, 1994; White, 199; 
Fenn & Liang, 2001), they have all found conflicting results. This can be attributed to their use of 
share ownership, which holds a substantial negative correlation with firm size. Our study uses 
both the risk-taking and pay-performance proxies to link compensation with dividends. 
Particularly, we place our attention on risk-taking incentive while incorporating pay-performance 
as a control variable.  
With risk incentive being the primary focus of our paper, we also account for the 
established relationship between risk and payout. Prior studies find that volatility holds a 
negative relationship with dividend payers as compared to non-payers (Malkiel & Xu, 2003; 
Brandt et al., 2005; Fink et al., 2006; Chay & Suh; 2008; Hoberg & Prabhala; 2008). In that vein, it 
will be of paramount importance to distinguish the effects of volatility and risk-taking incentive 
on dividends. Additionally, we wish to examine the influence of risk-taking motivation in high 
volatility firms. In the most volatile firms, risk-taking incentive is found to have a different role 
than earlier predicted. Those companies are already experiencing high volatility and will be 
compensated through their risk incentives. There would be little-added remuneration for taking 
on more risk at that point. A dividend increase would be thus far more likely as compared to a 
risk inducing project. Our findings support this in that risk-taking incentive interacted with 
volatility provides use with a positive explanation of dividend per share. 
In terms of data concerning payout and CEO compensation, we use separate databases 
such as Execucomp and Compustat making sure to cross-reference CEO and firm specific data via 
CORPEROL and GVKEY. In doing so, we obtain both a complete picture of the CEO and firm with 
accompanying proxy values via Core & Guay (2001) and Coles et al. (2013).  From this, we run 
logit and multi linear regressions in which the regressands are a form of dividend payout. These 
different forms are represented in the following ways: Dividend per Share, Dividend Growth, 
Dividend Increases, Constant Dividends, and Dividend Issuers vs. Non-Issuers. 
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We organize the remainder of our paper as follows: Section 2, the literature review, will provide a 
review of the existing literature which delivers a theoretical justification for our hypothesis and 
highlights the importance of the study. Section 3 provides different data 
sources used in addition to providing a methodology to our findings. Section 4 presents an 
analysis into the results of risk-takings impact on dividend level and increases. Section 5 
concludes our study by summarizing our key findings and providing future research 
considerations.
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2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 Dividends and Risk 
In looking at the reasoning behind dividends, we are met with multiple conflicting theories to 
explain payout (Battacharya, 1979; Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). We choose to 
focus on uncontested aspects of payout. Notably, that cash dividends require free cashflow to be 
paid. If the funds needed for a dividend are not available, the negative implications are severe. 
They include high borrowing costs, share price crashes and even CEO job losses in the worst of 
cases (Myers, 1977; Froot et al., 1993; Brav et al., 2005; DeAngelo et Al. 2009). The possibility that 
cashflow requirements may not be met is manifested in the form of shortfall risk. 
On the subject of risk, literature finds a negative relationship in explaining dividend payout 
(Malkiel & Xu, 2003; Brandt, Brav & Graham, 2005; Fink et al., 2006; Hoberg & Prabhala, 2008). 
These works focus on volatility, often measured through cashflow or earnings, as negatively 
explaining the propensity to issue and increase dividends. This is confirmed with later papers 
emphasizing that volatility is the solution as to why fewer firms are initiating dividends in the 21st 
century. The idea that risk can explain the reduction in dividends extends even before that. Some 
of the seminal work on dividends finds that volatility, measured in different forms, can have a 
substantial impact on payout policy (Eades, 1982; Miller & Rock, 1985; Fama & French, 2002). 
For the sake of our work, we focus on risk defined as cashflow volatility.  It is this method that 
prior research highlights has the explanatory power in the context of dividends (Bradley et al., 
1998). Also, risk managers themselves emphasize the importance of analyzing cashflow volatility 
in determining related risk decisions (Shapiro and Titman, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Froot et al., 1993; 
Shimko, 1997).  
 
2.1.2 Executive Compensation and Risk-Taking Incentive 
Toward the end of the last century, work by Hall & Liebman (1998), Murphy (1999) and Hall & 
Murphy (2001), show a distinct propagation of option payments in the structure of CEO 
compensation. Also, the average equity for top executives has risen to thirty times as large as 
their annual total salary. This idea adds upon the analysis of Core, Guay & Larcker (2001). They 
found that growth firms had a higher proportion of options awarded as compared to other 
industry types (2001, p.7);  
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The use of stock options and restricted stock in high-technology, new economy firms substantially 
exceeds the equity compensation in large, old economy manufacturing firms. 
 
A justification for this discrepancy was that higher option concentration addressed CEO risk 
aversion. Companies in the technology industry would need to spur growth through riskier 
endeavors as compared to more mature industries. With executives having already been shown 
to be risk averse to the detriment of their shareholders (Amihud & Lev, 1981; May, 1995; Smith & 
Stulz, 1985; Tuffano, 1996), a compensation scheme concentrated on options would provide a 
solution. A monetization scheme weighted towards options would reduce the impact of the 
agency issue (Jolls, 1998; Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999; Guay, 1999; Denis and Mihov, 2003; Chava 
& Purnanadam, 2009; Armstrong & Vashishtha, 2012). Defusco et al., (1990) provide credence to 
this belief in finding that disclosures related to stock and option incentivization plans have 
empirically been met with positive price returns. This point a representation that options are 
inducing management to be riskier, in line with what shareholders wanted. Given the direct 
relationship between option value and underlying volatility in the Black Scholes Merton model, 
riskier strategies would maximize CEO option wealth. Coupled with the fact that a typical CEO 
salary no longer relies on flow compensation (Jensen & Murphy; 1990), we see causation 
between current day incentivization and corporate decision making.  
In wishing to quantify risk-taking propensity of executives, we focus our attention on the 
proxy Vega, as developed by Core & Guay (2001). This is a departure from earlier studies that 
solely relied on options or share ownership. Those works found contradictory conclusions for 
compensation and dividend policy (Rozeff, 1982; Agrawal & Jayaraman, 1994; White, 1996; Fenn 
& Liang, 2001). Based on annual disclosure statements and the Black & Scholes (1973) and 
Merton (1973) adjusted model, we find the dollar change in CEO portfolio wealth for a one 
percent change in the company's underlying stock price volatility. This new proxy of sensitivity 
captures over 99% of actual portfolio value variation as tested through market data and 
simulation (Core et al., 2002).  A later adjustment by Daniel et al. (2013) considers changes in 
accounting standards. This allowed for greater information regarding tranche level details for 
option grants before 1992, representing a significant portion of CEO portfolio wealth. A similar 
proxy titled Delta accounts for pay-performance incentive. 
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Also of importance is the emphasis we place on the CEO of a company as opposed to other 
management figures. It is true the dividend decision is confirmed by the board of directors 
(DeAngelo et al.,2009). However, we find evidence stressing the importance of CEO behavior in 
dictating decisios made at the highest levels of corporate structures (Cronqvist et al., 2012). 
Findings support that CEOs hold a substantial input in companywide decision-making, even more 
so than CFOs (Chava & Purnanadam, 2009). When we consider CEO wealth, we find that a 
significant portion of portfolio wealth is reflected in company shares (Core et al., 2002). This 
makes it so shareholders are comparatively more diversified in their portfolio wealth. The last 
point speaks to the creation of a juxtaposition between shareholder risk appetite and 
management's risk-taking motivation (Myers, 1977; Murphy, 1999; Coles et al., 2006). This 
reinforces the importance risk-taking monetization in dealing with CEO risk aversion and by 
extension, decision making. When constructing compensation schemes for the CEO, the board 
must find a means to ensure the risk-taking incentive is appropriately present.  
Our measure of risk-taking sensitivity is shown to have an impact on corporate policy 
(Guay, 1999; Cohen et al., 2000; Coles et al., 2006; Croci & Petmezas, 2015). These findings 
pertain to how Vega positively explains increases in leverage, R&D, and volatility. Vega also has a 
negative role in determining capital expenditures and diversifying acquisitions, both considered to 
have little impact on increasing volatility. Overall, prior literature speaks to the fact that risk-
taking incentive has the undeniable effect of making CEOs pursue riskier endeavors. 
 
 
2.1.3 Executive Risk-Taking tied to Dividend Payout 
Given our understanding of risk and dividends, CEOs incentivized to take on risk would avoid 
increasing dividends. This follows the belief that a higher Vega causes CEOs to invest in more 
volatile projects instead (Guay, 1999; Cole et al., 2006). Given the finite amount of internal 
cashflow available for expenditures, dividends represent a constraint to management. The 
implications of a cashflow shortfall occurring include a dividend cut whose negative effect on 
stock price is well documented (Pettit, 1972; Aharony & Swary, 1980; Woolridge, 1982; Eades et 
al., 1985; Healy and Palepu, 1988).  
In a scenario where a large portion of portfolio wealth is derived from risk-taking 
incentive, the reluctance to altering payout would be amplified. The danger of increasing 
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downside loss is reinforced by survey data over the years which stresses how management 
practice dividend conservatism (Lintner, 1956; Brav et al., 2005). The latter paper strengthens this 
point with CFOs revealing that maintaining a consistent dividend with historical payout policy as 
either important or very important to setting new dividends. Those same respondents claimed 
risk as being a key determinant in setting new policy. 
 Given the structure of compensation that emphasizes risk-taking, proxied by Vega, we 
would expect management to limit the amount paid to dividends and instead choose more 
volatile projects. Conversely, in a firm with high earnings volatility, risk-taking incentive will be 
already satisfied. Standardized measures of risk will show a CEO incentivized to take on risk has 
completed his or her mandate.  As a result, the impact of risk taking incentive will vary depending 
on the volatility already associated within a firm. 
The impact of risk extends beyond increasing dividends but in looking at dividend growth 
and comparing dividend payers vs. non-payers. Also, it is important to note the asymmetry 
between increases and cuts in dividend level. In the context of risk, we would not expect a CEO 
with high risk-taking incentive to actively pursue a dividend cut, or more severely an omission. 
This can be attributed to the overwhelming negative market reaction and management's general 
reluctance towards such corporate policy (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990; Allen & Michealy, 2003; 
Brav et al., 2005). The documented asymmetry between increases and decreases in payout 
(DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990; Allen & Michealy, 2003) speaks to the fact that both should be 
analyzed separately in the context of risk-taking incentive. In part due to the presence of pay-
performance incentive that has empirically been shown to dominate risk-taking incentive (Core & 
Guay, 2001). 
 
 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
In applying our understanding of dividends and their relationship to CEO risk tolerance and pay-
performance, we can hypothesize that Vega will negatively predict dividend level. This is 
grounded in the belief that higher risk-taking incentive would lead management to invest in 
riskier projects instead of dividends. Rational CEOs with high risk-taking incentive who seek 
wealth maximization would focus on pursuing riskier projects to maximize portfolio wealth. To 
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add to this belief, executives would also limit their downside risk in that they would not grow 
their payout demand. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: CEO risk-taking incentive negatively affects Dividend per Share, ceteris paribus. 
 
This work is advanced by our analysis into dividend increases and constant dividends. Specifically, 
we will try to explain dividend increases through risk-taking incentive and earnings volatility. Our 
first and most important belief is that risk-taking incentive, proxied by Vega, will negatively 
predict increases in dividend level. The framework this follows is like how we justified the 
negative explanatory power of risk taking in determining Dividend per Share. A higher risk-taking 
incentive would lead a CEO to fund projects that are considered risky. We expect this 
understanding to apply to dividends remaining constant as well. An important distinction with 
keeping dividends constant over the year ensures shortfall possibility is not augmented. This 
allows for investment in risk inducing projects while keeping the possibility of a cashflow crunch 
limited. As such, risk-taking incentive will be predictive of keeping the dividend fixed. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: CEO risk-taking incentive negatively affects the occurrence of dividend increases, 
ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 2b: CEO risk-taking incentive positively affects the occurrence of a dividend remaining 
the same, ceteris paribus. 
 
Incorporating the impact of earnings volatility, we contrast high and low volatility on payout. This 
is done to verify that risk-taking incentive has a separate impact when volatility has already been 
achieved. We do so by interacting our Vega proxy with measurements of earnings volatility. This 
provides a basis to see if firms with both higher earnings volatility and risk-taking incentive will be 
more likely to increase dividends. The expectation is that a CEO who is incentivized to take on risk 
and whose firm has high volatility has already achieved his goal. As such, investments in riskier 
projects will not be needed, and dividends will no longer be a bane to portfolio wealth.  To 
provide an example, let us imagine two companies are both required to pay 100$ in dividends. 
The first company has low cashflow volatility and expects either 100$ or 300$ when dividends are 
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due. The higher cashflow volatility firm expects either 0$ or 400$. In this scenario, the higher 
volatility firm does not stand to increase the possibility of shortfall if they increase cashflow 
towards dividends. It is for this reason that Vega in already volatile firms will have a positive 
predictive power in dividend growth for firms that have increased their dividend. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The effect of risk-taking incentive interacted with volatility on dividend growth is 
positive in firms. 
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3. Data & Methodology 
3.1 Dividend Per Share, Dividend Increases and Constant Dividend 
The findings in our work will involve multiple measurements of dividend payout as the explained 
variable. We start with OLS regressions in annual Dividend per Share (DPS), which is calculated 
and obtained via Compustat using GVKEY as a firm identifier. The average DPS in our sample is 
0.34$ and this figure includes 8062 (51%) observations which involve no dividend payment.  We 
also use this to determine Dividend Growth over years, which has an average value of 9%. 
We additionally create dummy variables for incidences in which there was an increase or 
constant payout. These variables take a value of one if the dividend policy occurs or zero if not. 
We analyze Dividend per Share in cases of dividend increases for robustness in our results 
regarding risk-taking incentives impact on payout. Our data finds 5625 (34%) Dividend Increases 
and 7673 (47%) instances in which the dividend stayed the same. The remaining dividend 
movements are cuts and excluded from our work due to their inherit differences from standard 
dividend policy (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990; Allen & Michealy, 2003; Brav et al., 2005). In 
dealing with the large number of firms that choose not to pay dividends, we use these firms to 
contrast Dividend Payers vs. Non Payers in our regression analysis. We find that there are 8062 
(49%) firm year observations of firms paying a dividend. Our variable of Dividend Payer takes a 
value of 1 for each of these firms and 0 for those that issue no dividend. We finally make sure to 
exclude special dividends and share repurchases from our sample.  
 
[Table 3.1 Frequency and Averages of Dependent Variables] 
 
[Table 3.2 Descriptive Summary of Dependent Variables] 
 
3.2 Risk-taking incentive and Risk: Vega and Volatility 
Using portfolio data on Execucomp, we estimate both pay-performance and risk-taking sensitivity 
as per Core & Guay (2001). We however decide to use more recent literature (Coles et al., 2013) 
that provides us proxies for risk-taking and pay-performance incentive dating back to the year 
1993. A benefit of using this more recent data is that it considers changes in accounting 
standards. This removes a level of ambiguity about prior stock and option grants that was a 
criticism directed at the work of Core & Guay. Delta and Vega, our proxies for CEO pay-
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performance incentive and risk-taking incentive, comes from the data of Coles et al. (2006) and 
Core & Guay (2002) which provides us motivation metrics centered primarily on portfolio wealth. 
Their data includes Delta, which represents in our study the dollar value of portfolio wealth 
associated with a one percent rise in the underlying company’s stock price. Vega represents the 
dollar-value of portfolio wealth related to a one percent rise in the underlying company's stock 
price volatility. Given that Vega solely derives from a CEOs option portfolio and option value's 
positive relationship to underlying volatility (Stulz, 1984; Smith & Stulz, 1985), it proves to be a 
strong proxy of a manager’s incentive to increase firm risk. We make sure to scale our proxies by 
firm assets similar to our treatment of firm characteristics. This method is unique in the treatment 
of Vega in that other research uses the natural logarithmic value of Vega (Cohen et al., 2000; 
Coles et al., 2006; Croci & Petmezas, 2015). As such, we find a middle ground in using both 
methods and seeing if our results hold true. For Vega scaled by assets, we obtain an average value 
of 0.65$ and for the logarithmic value of Vega, we have 9.89$.  When we consider the changes 
made to our proxies, they are consistent with other metrics of risk-taking incentive (Guay, 1999; 
Core & Guay, 1999; Barclay et al., 2001; Richardson, 2002). 
Incorporating the manager's portfolio of stocks and options, our methodology takes into 
account both vested and unvested stock options. One important point of consideration is that 
unearned options or options that require the meeting of a prior agreed upon performance 
measure be excluded in the calculation of our proxies for CEO pay-performance and risk-taking 
sensitivity. This is to ensure that CEO portfolio wealth is as accurate a measure as possible of 
the CEOs current situation and because of the lack of disclosure requirements surrounding 
unearned options (Core & Guay, 2002; Coles et al., 2013). While some feel that this identical 
treatment creates a problem due to the inherent differences between vested and non-vested 
options, we provide two justifications as to why they are treated the same. The first that 
requirements associated with unvested options are more straightforward and transparent. They 
involve continued employment at the firm as compared to unearned options, which are 
conditional on an infinitely diverse set of criteria. Secondly, the fact that the BSM option 
valuation model treats options valuation the same regardless of vesting status speaks to how 
both are similar regarding value. Even still, we consider that in removing these performance 
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bonuses from our proxies, our findings underestimate the true impact of pay-performance and 
risk-taking incentive on dividend policy.  
In addition to Vega, we emphasize firms with high earnings volatility. Earnings volatility is 
constructed as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings before extraordinary items scaled by 
the book value of total assets over a five-year rolling period (Dichev & Tang, 2008; Jayaraman, 
2008). Based on that, we create dummy variables for the highest earnings volatility firms with 
which we interact with our Vega measurements. This is done to verify our hypothesis regarding 
risk-taking incentive having a positive impact determining payout in firms with high volatility. We 
also use a continuous variable of volatility in our work. This to show that our belief is applicable 
in all cases and not just in the most volatile of firms. We use earning volatility to proxy for 
cashflow volatility given the high correlation between the two and missing values of cashflow 
(Graham et al., 2005; Jayaraman, 2008). We realize that earnings are inherently smoother than 
cashflow and this will understate the impact of volatility in our findings. 
 
3.3 Control Variables 
Our CEO control variables stem from data in Execucomp across a period starting in 1990 to 
current year. Key management characteristics provide variables such as gender, tenure and new 
CEO. These have empirically been shown to impact corporate policy which dividends fall under 
(Demarzo & Duffie, 1995; Berger et al., 1997). Especially important is the presence of an interlock 
agreement which allows for a CEO to hold sway over his own compensation structure. This 
relates to our own interest in CEO risk-taking incentive. The primary reason for CEO qualitative 
data inclusion is that it acts as control variables in our analysis and provides more clarity to the 
effect a CEO has on dividend payout policy.  
To supplement that, we find firm-specific characteristics from Compustat via the GVKEY 
which acts as a unique firm identifier provided to us in Execucomp. Focusing on firm specific data, 
we include leverage, cash holdings, and profitability, to be consistent with prior dividend 
literature (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990; Bulan & Subramanian, 2008). Long-term debt is scaled by 
assets to provide us a measure of leverage with the expectation being that debt would limit the 
ability to increase dividends (Crutchley & Hansen, 1989; Jensen et al., 1992). Cash holdings work 
in the opposite manner in that more cash on hand has been shown to lead to higher dividends 
and dividend initiations.  Our definition of cash holdings is cash and short-term investments 
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similarly scaled by total assets (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2006). Finally, profitability is simply 
earnings, scaled by total assets (Fama and French, 2002) which we expect to be positively related 
to both dividend per share and dividend increases. 
We also incorporate firm size and growth opportunities (Desmukh, 2003; Fama & 
French, 2002; Bulan et al., 2005; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2006). The role of firm size can be 
attributed to information asymmetry being lower with larger firms because of stable cash flows 
and higher analyst coverage among other factors (Bushan, 1989; Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Chari et 
al., 1988; Smith & Watts, 1992). Market to book ratio is used to capture investment and growth 
opportunities. This was incorporated under the belief that the market value of equity scaled by 
its book value will be indicative of whether a firm was considered to be growing or already in 
the mature phase (D’Mello & Ferris, 2000 ). Some studies include lifecycle via retained earnings 
(DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2006) under the expectation that older more mature firms will have 
established retained earnings. We do not, primarily because much of retained earnings in our 
sample is both negative and large in magnitude. Additionally, retained earnings shows a weak 
correlation with life-cycle stage. 
 
 
 
[Table 3.3 Independent Variable Definitions and Data sources] 
 
 
 
 
When we cross-reference the Execucomp database with our Delta and Vega values mentioned 
above and Compustat data using Coperol as a unique CEO identifier, we are presented with 
16,331 observations with both firm-specific and CEO data. In removing both Financials and Utility 
firms via their SIC codes (6000-6999 & 4900-4999) and accounting for observations with missing 
data, this number is further reduced to 16,248 observations. All observations at this point are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate outliers. 
 
[Table 3.4 Summary Statistics] 
 
 
[Table 3.5 Pearson Correlation coefficients among Independent variables]
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3.4 Methodology 
With our data, we run a multivariate regression on dividend per share with CEO and firm 
characteristics to confirm hypothesis 1a, as seen below. 
 
Dividend per Share = β0 + β1Delta + β2Vega + β3Volatility +              (1) 
β4Vega× Volatility + Controls + ϵτ 
 
 
Our coefficient of interest in this model will be β4 in determining if risk-taking incentive dictates 
dividend level. The expectation being that the coefficient is significant and negative. We also 
place emphasis on β4 expecting that in high volatility firms we will be able to find that Vega has 
a positive explanatory power in payout. The change in sign associated with the coefficients of 
Vega and Vega interacted with volatility can be explained. In a firm with high volatility, the CEO 
will have already achieved his goal of increasing risk. As such, a dividend will not carry with it 
the same repercussion of limiting the projects a CEO has to invest in. In a comparatively less 
volatile firm, a CEO will have to invest in more riskier projects to increase his portfolio wealth. 
In this case, the CEO will not be satisfying his risk-taking incentives and will try to recompense 
by investing in projects that will increase volatility in the firm. The ability to increase the 
dividend will be forgone for riskier possibilities, affirming hypothesis 3a. 
We also run a series of logit regressions in which the explained variable would take the 
form of dividend policy in the following ways: dividend increases, constant dividend and 
dividend payers vs. non-payers. 
 
Logit (Dividend Policy / (1− Policy)= β0 + β1Delta + β2Vega + β3Volatility +    (2)
   β4Vega× Volatility +Controls + ϵτ  
 
 
 
The variables of interest to us in the logit regression models are primarily Vega and the 
interaction with volatility.  We expect significance for β2 in the setting of both dividend 
increases and constant dividends affirming hypotheses 2a and 2b. Like our expectation 
regarding Vega and dividend per share, we expect the coefficient to be negative in explaining 
dividend increases. Conversely, we expect Vega to have a positive coefficient in explaining 
dividends remaining constant. This goes back to our understanding that managers incentivized 
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to take on risk need funds to bankroll their pursuit of risk. Keeping a dividend constant allows 
for this whereas increasing a dividend would limit cash flow and not increase the risk profile of 
the firm. 
Our use of logit regressions presents us a problem in that a minority of papers use more 
complex survival models, which consider the entire history of the firm (Desmukh, 2003; Bulan 
et al., 2005; Bulan & Subramian, 2007). We respond to this by incorporating three years equally 
weighted rolling averages of the firm characteristics when applicable. In doing so, we provide 
smoothed values for our explanatory variables under both categories of firm specifics which 
considers a longer period rather than the year of the event. The primary benefit of this is to not 
look at immediate changes in the year prior which in some cases may distort findings as they 
pertain to payout dates not aligning with announcement dates. We also create industry 
dummies via Fama & French's 12 industry classifications using the SIC code provided in 
Execucomp. Similarly, market shocks are accounted for by assigning annual dummies for all the 
years used and our data is winsorized at the 99% level.
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4. Analysis 
4.1 Dividend Per Share and Dividend Growth  
In our analysis of dividend payout, we wish to focus on the impact of risk-taking incentive on 
different ranges of payout changes. We begin by analyzing the change in dividend per share. 
 
[Table 4.1 Dividend Per Share Model] 
 
Immediately we see that Vega does have a statistically significant influence on dividend per share 
in the series of regressions confirming hypothesis 1a. In all iterations of the model, columns (1) to 
(4), we find a significant coefficient associated with Vega. These values are all negative which 
indicates that a higher risk-taking incentive explains a lower dividend per share among firms. This 
speaks to the fact that a manager paid to increase the volatility of his or her firm would be 
reluctant to invest the company’s free cash flow into payout. Instead, they would opt for other 
projects that are categorized as having a higher risk profile. The aforementioned does affirm the 
underpinnings of our research discussed earlier. Primarily, that risk-taking incentive is effective in 
making managers veer away from non-risky endeavors (Eades, 1992; Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 
2006). 
     In turning our attention to the volatility in the firm, we find in column (4) that volatility 
does have a negative coefficient, albeit statistically insignificant. Our variables of interest, an 
interaction of risk-taking incentive with firm volatility, is positive and significant at the 10% level. 
With a coefficient of 3.452, we find that in a firm with more volatile cashflows, risk-taking 
incentive could influence a manager to place more money into dividends. This may seem to be 
the direct opposite of what we found in regards to Vega and payout. The explanation for this 
discrepancy is that when accounting for volatility in the firm, risk-taking incentive doesn’t dictate 
CEOs to avoid dividends. To justify that, the more volatile the firm, the more risk-taking incentives 
have already been met. With the point of the incentivization having already been satisfied, CEOs 
are no longer forced to invest in obscure projects and can revert to more traditional outlays of 
cashflow. Dividends definitively fall under the latter in that they are not associated with risk in the 
form of volatility, but rather with shortfall risk (Malkiel & Xu, 2003; Brandt, Brav & Graham, 2005; 
Fink et al., 2006; Chay & Suh, 2008; Hoberg & Prabhala, 2008). Shortfall risk is not compensated 
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for via risk-taking incentive. This makes dividends a suitable investment for managers once they 
have already achieved their goal of portfolio maximization.  
Our model with both CEO and firm characteristics is comprehensive in finding the 
determinants of dividend per share. The explanatory power of the model is profound with an R 
squared value of 14%, in line with similar research done in the field of risk-taking incentive (Coles 
et al., 2006). Those studies and our own don’t aim to forecast dividends. Our goal is to solely 
determine the role risk-taking incentive plays in formulating dividend policy. We also verify 
control factors that we expect to be positively related to dividends per share such as size and 
profitability. These factors are shown to be statistically significant and positive, consistent with 
prior literature (Fama & French, 2002;). We also find that leverage and CEO tenure holds a 
negative explanatory power explaining dividend per share (Bulan & Subramian, 2008; DeAngelo et 
Al.2009). Leverage as it pertains to greater cashflow requirements and CEO tenure as it points to 
management often accumulating many options over time. The latter point is related to wanting to 
maximize portfolio wealth given the positive relationship between risk and option value. As we 
explained with risk taking incentive, when increasing risk is a priority, dividends are avoided. 
Pay-performance incentive, proxied by Delta, is also significant and negative. With our 
understanding of the positive price reaction associated with dividend growth (Lease et al., 2000; 
Allen & Michealy, 2003; Frankfurter and Wood, 2003), we would expect the coefficient to be 
positive. To explain, CEOs with higher amounts of wealth tied to stock price would rationally want 
to pursue payout policy that would maximize their financial well-being. The phenomenon of pay-
performance having a negative impact on dividends relates to the belief that pay-performance 
itself is a bonding mechanism applied to management. Similarly, dividends act to soak up free 
cash to ensure management does not act against the will of shareholders. The presence of both 
creates a redundancy of bonding tools and as a result, the occurrence of high pay-performance 
often precludes higher dividends (James et al., 2016). 
    To further substantiate our findings related to risk-taking incentive, we also analyze 
dividend per share growth in firms that have increased dividends as a dependent variable.  
 
[Table 4.2 Dividend Growth Model] 
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The primary differences in this model can be seen in alternatives forms of our variables of 
interest. Risk-taking and pay-performance incentive are both not scaled by assets whereas our 
volatility variable is switched to a binary value. In this instance, the variable high volatility 
indicates that a firm is in the highest quartile of earnings volatility. Even with different 
measurements of our explanatory variables, many of our findings remain unswerving. 
     Our risk-taking incentive proxy is both significant and negative in explaining dividend 
growth. This validates that risk incentive has the impact of veering a manager away from raising 
dividend outflow. Whether it be dividend level or the first difference, we see that Vega has a 
direct influence on dictating dividend policy. The reasoning behind this is also alike to what we 
previously discussed. If a manager wishes to increase the risk profile of his firm, to maximize their 
own portfolio wealth, they would opt for riskier projects. Investment in R&D or diversifying 
mergers are both examples of policy that have been positively explained by risk-taking incentive 
(Shimko, 1997; Coles et al., 2006). Whereas those cash outflows are considered volatile 
investments, dividends, on the other hand, are considered to be a much more conservative 
outflow (Brav et al., 200e). As a result, a manager compensated to take on risk would do away 
with the long-term cash drain of dividends. They would instead opt for short term projects that 
would have more variation in their possible outcomes than dividends.  
    Incorporating volatility into our model, we see in column (4) of Table 4.2 that our binary 
variable for high volatility has a negative coefficient again. However, like what we saw with 
dividend per share in Table 4.1, the variable is statistically insignificant. This is tempered by our 
interaction term for the high quartile of volatile firms and Vega, which is significant and positive. 
This finding goes hand in hand with our belief about compensation and dividends. In this case 
however, compensation has already been achieved due to the firm having high earnings volatility.  
A CEO would have already satisfied his risk-taking incentive and would even be compelled to 
increase dividends. We say compelled because of the free cash flow available. It is widely known 
that having too much free cash flow exasperates the agency issue (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 
1984; Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 2001). As a result, management would view a dividend increase 
as suitable in that scenario. This would allow for free cash flow to be soaked up and be used as a 
bonding tool. Having an abundant amount of cashflow with incentives already met could be 
potentially dangerous in the form of an egregious use of funds.   
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Overall, both the findings in our model of dividend per share and dividend growth validate 
hypothesis 1a and 3a. We confirm that risk-taking incentive has a negative impact on payout 
policy but that this changes in firms with higher earnings volatility. Notable control variables that 
are positively related to dividend growth include size, profitability, and cash on aand. These have 
direct causation as to why they increase dividend payout. In the instance of cash on hand, we 
believe that more cash available to a firm allows for management to distribute their internal 
funds. Unsurprisingly, the variable profitability has the greatest impact on dividend growth, 
consistent with prior research (Fama & French, 2002; Bulan et al., 2005; DeAngelo et al., 2006).  
 
4.1 Dividend Increase, Constant Dividend and Dividend Issuers 
Moving on to a deeper analysis of dividend policy, we focus our attention on analyzing 
dividend movements. This is done by conducting a series of logit regressions in which the 
dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the following criteria are met: increase in dividend from 
the prior year and constant dividend over the past year. We also contrast firms that choose to 
issue a dividend against those that do not. 
 
[Table 4.3 Dividend Increases and Constant Dividend Model] 
 
We importantly find that dividend increases in column (1) are shown to be partially explained by 
their negative relationship with Vega, confirming our earlier findings in dividend per share and 
dividend growth. The magnitude of the coefficient is also greater compared to other models. This 
indicates that risk-taking incentive has an even greater impact on the occurrence of a dividend 
increase than it does in the previous models. The value of -0.751 is substantial indicating that 
Vega has quite a considerable say in the occurrence of an annual dividend increase. This confirms 
hypothesis 2a linking Vega with dividend increases. Also of note is that our volatility variable is 
negative and significant. This is in line with research relating to risk and payout being inversely 
related (Denis & Osobov, 2008; Von Eije & Megginson, 2008; Chay & Suh, 2008; Hoberg & 
Prabhala, 2008; DeAngelo et al., 2009). Our distinction to this finding is that whereas risk is used 
to explain dividends, we use risk-taking motivation in the context of risk instead. The 
underpinnings of volatility negatively explaining dividend increases can be seen in how more 
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volatile earnings translates to uncertain cash inflow outcomes. In turn, higher variability in 
earnings makes it difficult to earmark the funds required for a dividend increase in the long-term 
future. Considering the negative implications of not having enough funds to cover a dividend, it is 
clear as to why volatile firms avoid dividend increases.  These range from increases in the cost of 
borrowing to missing a dividend payment (Shapiro and Titman, 1986; Stulz, 1990). The latter of 
which is avoided at all costs by management. 
The concept that risk-taking incentive is impactful on dividend policy is further reinforced 
by Column (2). The regressand of constant dividend in Table 4.3 shows the regressor Vega has a 
significantly positive explanatory power. The coefficient, in this case, is even larger at 1.009. To 
explain this result, managers incentivized to be risk-takers will invest in riskier projects (Guay, 
1999; Cohen et al., 2000; Coles et al., 2006; Croci & Petmezas, 2015). Secondly, they attempt to 
do so while ensuring their cashflow requirements are not increased thus lowering the probability 
of having a cash shortfall (Fazzari et al., 1988; Bradley et al., 1992; Minton & Schrand, 1999). It is 
noteworthy that solely in the case of keeping the dividend constant is the coefficient for Vega 
positive and that large in magnitude. It speaks to the implications that CEOs must face in pursuing 
risk because of their compensation structure. Keeping a dividend constant would provide added 
flexibility while avoiding the negative repercussions associated with a dividend decrease 
(DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990, Bulan et al., 2007). Supporting this justification is the finding that 
volatility positively explains the occurrence of a constant dividend. This speaks to need for 
financial flexibility that a constant dividend provides as compared to increasing payout. 
Both hypotheses 2a and 2b are confirmed through these logit regressions. In wishing to explore 
further the predictive power of risk-taking incentive on dividend policy, we analyze column (3) in 
Table 4.3. In this instance, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if any cash dividend was paid 
or 0 otherwise. In doing so, we determine that risk-taking incentive has a negative impact on 
dividend issuers with Vega having a coefficient of -1.043 and being statistically significant.  In 
accordance to what we’ve seen in Table 4.1 and 4.2, Vega highlights the fact that risk-taking 
incentive negatively explains a firm opting to pay a dividend. CEOs with higher Vega are less likely 
to pay a dividend as compared to their counterparts with lower Vega. 
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5. Conclusion 
In concluding our work, we wish to convey a message that stresses the actual results: risk-taking 
incentive plays a role in how dividend policy is formulated. Some of the most established 
literature speaks to the inverse relationship between risk and dividends (Bhattacharya, 1979; 
Miller & Rock, 1985; Fama & French, 2002). We have incorporated risk-taking incentive to delve 
further into this concept. This is exemplified in our analysis of dividend increases and constant 
dividends. In those cases, our proxy for risk-taking sensitivity Vega, is significant. This follows the 
understating that if a CEO is being paid to increase volatility they will invest in risky projects. 
Dividends will be avoided because they represent a long-term cash constraint that in turn 
hinders portfolio wealth. This justification is reinforced by how in firms with high volatility, risk-
taking incentive positively explains the phenomenon of higher dividends. In those firms, risk 
incentives have already been achieved, indicating that non-risk orientated policy could be 
pursued, even among managers with higher Vega.   
These findings are relevant in real life instances. Imagine how the discrepancy between 
risk tolerance and risk-taking ability could be alleviated via risk-taking incentives (Brav et al., 
2005)? Even the risk-taking incentive of the CEO could be analyzed so that stakeholders could 
vet the head of their company. This extends beyond solely shareholders concerned about 
dividend policy but to debt holders and creditors as well.   
With that said, both risk-taking and pay-performance incentive, coupled with other 
established firm and CEO characteristics, can and should be used in analyzing dividend policy. It 
is not our goal to find a definitive answer as to what drives dividends. We rather propose that 
CEO risk-taking compensation plays a role. With our results, we believe to have validated this 
belief. Coupled with other research, one can provide a stronger understanding as to the 
determinants of dividend policy. 
About how to further develop this research, we plan to address the concern brought 
forward in Chav & Purnanandam (2009) which contests that the CEO is less involved in corporate 
policy than some behavioral finance studies assume. They place at odds the Delta and Vega of 
the CEO with the CFO and find that the latter has more of an impact in corporate decision 
making. Using our measures for both Delta and Vega provided by Coles et al., (2013), we have 
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figures on all executive members of the management team which includes CEO, CFO, COO, and 
others. It would be worthwhile to comparatively analyze a company's management and see 
whose incentive has the greatest impact on policy decisions in the realm of dividend policy and 
possibly more.
23 
 
References 
Agrawal, Anup, and N Jayaraman. "The Dividend Policies of All-equity Firms: A Direct Test of the Free Cash Flow 
Theory." Managerial and Decision Economics 15.2 (1994): 139-48. Web. 
 
Aggarwal, Rajesh, and A Samwick. "Empire-Builders and Shirkers: Investment, Firm Performance, and Managerial 
Incentives." The Journal of Finance (1999): n. pag. Web. 
 
Aharony, Joseph, and It Swary. "Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements and Stockholders' Returns: An 
Empirical Analysis." The Journal of Finance 35.1 (1980): 1. Web. 
 
Allen, F. and R. Michaely (2003), ‘Payout policy’. In: G. M. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz (eds.): North 
Holland Handbook of the Economics of Finance. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V. 
 
Amihud, Y, and B Lev. "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers." The Bell Journal of 
Economics 12.2 (1981): 605. Web. 
 
Asquith, P , and D W Mullins Jr ( 1983), "The impact of initiating dividend payments on shareholders' wealth", 
Journal of Business 56 ( 1):77-96. 
 
Armstrong, Christopher S., and Rahul Vashishtha. 2012. “Executive Stock Options, Differential Risk-Taking 
Incentives, and Firm Value.” Journal of Financial Economics 104 (1): 70–88. 
 
Bates, T. W., K. Kahle and R. Stulz, 2009, "Why Do U.S. Firms Hold so Much More Cash than They Used to?" Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 64, pp. 1985-2021. 
 
Benartzi, S , R Michaely and R Thaler ( 1997), "Do changes in dividends signal the future or the past?", Journal of 
Finance 52 ( 3): 1007-1043. 
 
Berger, P. Ofek, E.. Yermack, D., 1997, Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. Journal of 
Finance. 52: 1411-1438. 
 
Bhattacharya, S ( 1979), "Imperfect information, dividend policy, and 'the bird in the hand' fallacy", Bell Journal of 
Economics 10 ( 1):259-270. 
 
Bhushan, Ravi. "Firm Characteristics and Analyst following." Journal of Accounting and Economics 11.2-3 (1989): 
255-74. Web. 
 
Black, E, and M Scholes ( 1974), "The effects of dividend yield and dividend policy on common stock prices and 
returns", Journal of Financial Economics 1:1-22. 
 
Bradley, M., Capozza, D., and Seguin, P. 1998. Dividend Policy and Cash-Flow Uncertainty. Real Estate Economics 
26, 555-580. 
 
Michael W. Brandt, Alon Brav, John R. Graham, Alok Kumar; The Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle: Time Trend or 
Speculative Episodes?. Rev Financ Stud 2010; 23 (2): 863-899. doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhp087 
 
Brav, A., J. R. Graham, C. R. Harvey, and R. Michaely (2005), ‘Payout policy in the 21st century’. Journal of Financial 
Economics 77, 483–52
24 
 
Brav, A., J. R. Graham, C. R. Harvey, and R. Michaely (2008), ‘Managerial response to the May 2003 dividend tax 
cut’. Financial Management, forthcoming. 
 
Brickley, J ( 1983), "Shareholders wealth, information signaling, and the specially designated dividend: an empirical 
study", Journal of Financial Economics 12:187-209. 
 
Bulan, L. T. and N. Subramanian (2008), ‘The firm life cycle theory of dividends’. In: H. Kent Baker (ed.): The 
Blackwell Companion to Dividends and Dividend Policy. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Bulan, L. T., N. Subramanian, and L. Tanlu (2007), ‘On the timing of dividend initiations’. Financial Management 36, 
31–65. 
 
Charest, G ( 1978), "Dividend information, stock returns and market efficiency II", Journal of Financial Economics 
6:297-330. 
 
Chay, J. B. and J. Suh (2008), ‘Payout policy and cash-flow uncertainty’. Journal of Financial Economics, 
forthcoming. 
 
Chava, S., & Purnanandam, A. (2010). CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 97(2), 263e278 
 
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 79(2), 431–468. 
 
Christie, W , and V Nanda ( 1994), "Free cash flow, shareholder value, and the undistributed profits tax of 1936 and 
1937 ", Journal of Finance 49 ( 5):1727-1754 
 
Christie, W. G. (1990), ‘Dividend yield and expected returns: The zero dividend puzzle’. Journal of Financial 
Economics 28, 95–125. 
 
Cohen, R., Hall, B., Viceira, L., 2000. Do executive stock options encourage risk-taking? Working Paper. Harvard 
Business School. 
 
Core, J. and W. Guay, 1999, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 28: 151-184. 
 
Core, J., and W. Guay, 2001, Stock Option Plans for Non-executive Employees. Journal of Financial Economics 61: 
253-287. 
 
Core, J., Guay, W., 2002. Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price 
and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research 40, 613–630. 
 
Core, J., Guay, W., 2002. The other side of the trade-off: the impact of risk on executive compensation a revised 
comment. Working paper. University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Core, J. and D. Larcker, 2001, Performance Consequences of Mandatory Increases in CEO Stock Ownership. 
Working paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Croci, E., Petmezas, D., 2015. Do risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to invest? Evidence from acquisitions. J. Corp. 
Finan. 32, 1–2 
 
Cronqvist, H., Heyman, F., Nilsson, M., Svaleryd, H., & Vlachos, J. (2009). Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their 
Workers More? Journal of Finance, 64(1), 309-339. 
 
Crutchley, C., and Hansen, R., 1989, “A test of the agency theory of managerial ownership, corporate leverage, and 
corporate dividends,” Financial Management 18, winter, 36-46.
25 
 
Daniel, N., Li, Y., and Naveen, L. 2013. No asymmetry in pay for luck. Working Paper.calculates a measure of firm- 
specific wealth using executives’ stock and option portfolios 
 
D'Mello, Ranjan and Ferris, Stephen P., The Information Effects of Analyst Activity at the Announcement of New 
Equity Issues. Financial Management, Vol. 29, Issue 1, Spring 2000. Available at 
 
De Angelo, H , and L De Angelo ( 1990), "Dividend policy and financial distress: an empirical investigation of 
troubled NYSE firms", Journal of Finance 45 ( 5):1415-1431. 
 
De Angelo, H., L. De Angelo, and R. Stulz (2006), ‘Dividend policy and the earned/contributed capital mix: A test of 
the life-cycle theory’. Journal of Financial Economics 81, 227–254. 
 
DeFusco, R., Johnson, R., Zorn, T., 1990. The effect of executive stock option plans on stockholders and 
bondholders. Journal of Finance 45, 617–627. 
 
DeMarzo, Peter and Darrell Duffie (1995), “Corporate incentives for hedging and hedge accounting”, The Review of 
Financial Studies, 8(3), 743-771. 
 
Denis, D., Mihov, V., 2003. The choice among bank debt non-bank private debt, and public debt: evidence from 
new corporate borrowings. J. Financ. Econ. 70, 3–28. 
 
Deshmukh, S. (2003), Dividend Initiations and Asymmetric Information: A Hazard Model. Financial Review, 38: 
351–368. doi:10.1111/1540-6288.00050 
 
Eades, K. (1982). Empirical Evidence on Dividends as a Signal of Firm Value. The Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis,17(4), 471-500. doi:10.2307/2330903 
 
Eades, K , P Hess and H E Kim ( 1984), "On interpreting security returns during the ex-dividend period", Journal of 
Financial Economics 13:3-34. 
 
Easterbrook, EH ( 1984), "Two agency-cost explanations of dividends", American Economic Review 74 ( 4):650-659. 
Elton, E , and M Grub 
 
Eaton, J., and H. S. Rosen. 1983. Agency, delayed compensation, and the structure of executive remuneration. 
Journal of Finance 38 (December): 1489–1505. 
 
Fama, E , and K French ( 2001), "Disappearing dividends: changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to 
pay?", Journal of Financial Economics 60:3-43. 
 
Fama, E. F. and K. R. French (2002), ‘Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about dividends and debt’. 
Review of Financial Studies 15, 1–33. 
 
Fazzari, S., Hubbard, R., Petersen, B., 1988. Financing constraints and corporate investment. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 1, 141}195 
 
Fenn, G , and N Liang ( 2001), "Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives", Journal of Financial 
Economics 60:45-72. 
 
Fink, J., K. W. Fink, G. Grullon, and J. P. Weston. Forthcoming. What Drove the Increase in Idiosyncratic Volatility 
during the Internet Boom? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 
 
Frankfurter, G. M. and B. G.Wood (with J.Wansley) (2003), Dividend Policy: Theory and Practice. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Science BV. 
 
Froot, K., Scharfstein, D., & Stein, J. (1993). Risk management: Coordinating corporate investment and f inancing 
policies. Journal of Finance vol.48, p. 1624-1658 
 
Graham, J. R. and A. Kumar (2006), ‘Do dividend clienteles exist? Evidence on dividend preferences of retail 
investors’. Journal of Finance 61, 1305–1336.
26 
 
Grullon, G , and R Michaely ( 2002), "Dividends, share repurchases and the substitution hypothesis", The Journal of 
Finance 62 ( 4):1649-1684. 
 
Grullon, G , R Michaely and B Swaminathan ( 2002), "Are dividend changes a sign of firm maturity?", The Journal of 
Business 75:387-424. 
 
Guay, W., 1999, The Sensitivity of CEO Wealth to Equity Risk: An Analysis of the Magnitude and Determinants. 
Journal of Financial Economics 53: 43-71. 
 
Hall, B., and J. Liebman, 1998. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 653- 
691.  
 
Hall, B. and K. Murphy, 2001, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives. Working paper, Harvard University. 
 
Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu (1988), ‘Earnings information conveyed by dividend initiations and omissions’. 
Journal of Financial Economics 21, 149–176. 
 
Hoberg, G. and N. R. Prabhala (2008), ‘Disappearing dividends, catering, and risk’. Review of Financial Studies 22, 
79–116. 
 
Jagannathan, M , C P Stephens and M S Weisbach ( 2000), "Financial flexibility and the choice between dividends 
and stock repurchases", Journal of Financial Economics 57:355-384. 
 
Jensen, G. R., Solberg, D. P., & Zorn, T. S. (1992). Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership, Debt, and 
Dividend Policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27(2), 247-263. 
 
Jensen, M C ( 1986), "Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers", American Economic 
Review 76 ( 2):323-329. 
 
Jensen, M. and K. Murphy, (1990), Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy 
98, 225-264. 
 
Jolls, C ( 1998), "The role of incentive compensation in explaining the stock repurchase puzzle", Working Paper 
(Harvard Law School) 
 
Lang, L. H. P. and R. H. Litzenberger (1989), ‘Dividend announcements: Cash flow signaling vs. free cash flow 
hypothesis’. Journal of Financial Economics 24, 181–192. 
 
Lease, R. C., K. John, A. Kalay, U. Loewenstein, and O. H. Sarig (2000), Dividend Policy: Its Impact on Firm Value. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Lessard, D., 1990. Global competition and corporate Finance in the 1990s. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 3, 
59}72. 
 
Lintner, J ( 1956), "Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained earnings, and taxes", 
American Economic Review 46 ( 2):97-113. 
 
May, D., (1995), Do managerial motives influence firm risk reduction strategies? Journal of Finance. 50: 1291-1308. 
Malkiel, B. G. and Y Xu, 2003. Investigating the Behavior of Idiosyncratic Volatility. Journal of Business 76:613–44. 
Michaely, R , R H Thaler and K Womack ( 1995), "Price reactions to dividend initiations and omissions: overreaction 
or drift?", Journal of Finance 50 ( 2):573-608. 
 
Miller, M , and K Rock ( 1985), "Dividend policy under asymmetric information", Journal of Finance 40 ( 4): 1031- 
1051 
 
Minton, B., & Schrand, C. (1999). The Impact of Cash Flow Volatility on Discretionary Investment and the Costs of 
Debt and Equity Financing. Journal of Financial Economics vol.54, p.423-460
27 
 
 
Murphy, K. (1998), ‘Executive compensation’. In: O. Ashen felterand D. Card (eds.): North Holland Handbook of 
Labor Economics.Amsterdam: Elsevier Science BV. 
 
Murphy, K., 1999, Executive Compensation, in Ed. O Ashenfelter and D. Card, Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 
III, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2485-2563. 
 
Myers, S C ( 1977), "Determinants of corporate borrowing", Journal of Financial Economics 5 ( 2): 147-175. 
 
Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson (1999), ‘The determinants and implications of corporate cash 
holdings’. Journal of Financial Economics 52, 3–46. 
 
Pettit, R R ( 1972), "Dividend announcements, security performance, and capital market efficiency", Journal of 
Finance 27 ( 5):993-1007. 
 
Rozeff, M. (1982), ‘Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios’. Journal of Financial 
Research 5, 249–259. 
 
Shapiro, A., Titman, S., 1986. An integrated approach to corporate risk management. In: Stern, J., Chew, D. (Eds.), 
The Revolution in Corporate Finance. Basil Blackwell, New York, pp. 331}354. 
 
Shimko, D., 1997. Yearnings per share. Risk 10, 37. 
 
Smith, C., Stulz, R., 1985. The determinants of firm’s hedging policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
20, 391-405. 
 
Smith, Jr., C. W. and R. L. Watts (1992), ‘The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and 
compensation policies’. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 263–292. 
Stulz, R. (1990), ‘Managerial discretion and optimal financial policies’.Journal of Financial Economics 26, 3–27. 
Tufano, P., 1996. Who manages risk? An empirical examination of risk management practices in the gold mining 
industry. Journal of Finance 51, 1097-1137. 
Woolridge, J. R. (1982), ‘The information content of dividend changes’.Journal of Financial Research 5, 237–247. 
White, Lourdes Ferreira. "Executive Compensation and Dividend Policy." Journal of Corporate Finance 2.4 (1996): 
335-58. Web.
28 
 
Table 3.1 Frequency and Averages of Dependent Variables 
The below table and figure present the quantitative summary of our dependent variables. In terms 
of binary variables, we have Dividend Increases, Constant Dividend, Dividend Decreases, and 
Dividend payers. We also include our two continuous dependent variables Dividend per Share and 
Dividend Growth. These values are taken from our final sample of 16,307 firm year observations.  
 
 
 
 
  
Dividend 
Increases 
(Percent) 
Constant 
Dividend 
(Percent) 
Dividend 
Decreases 
(Percent) 
Dividend Payers 
(Percent) 
Policy Event did not 
Occur 
10689 8641 13298 8268 
 66% 53% 82% 51% 
Policy Event Occurred 5625 7673 3016 8062 
  34% 47% 18% 49% 
VARIABLES N Mean S.D Units p25 p50 p75 
Dividend Per Share 16,330 0.349 0.731 $ 0 0.0375 0.50 
Dividend Per Share 
Growth 
16,330 0.098 2.374 % 0 0 0.042 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Summary of Dependent Variables 
This table presents an overview of the dependent variables used in our research. Dividend Per Share 
and Dividend Growth represent the only continuous variables whereas all others are binary with a 
value of 1 if the event occurred, 0 otherwise. Furthermore, all dividends are annually paid in cash as 
stock dividends are excluded from our sample.  
 
 
 
Dependent Variable                                                                    Definition 
 
Dividend Per share  
 
Dividend Growth 
 
 
 
Dividend Increase 
 
Constant Dividend 
 
 
Dividend Issuer vs. Non-
Issuer 
Measured as current year Cash Dividend scalled by shares outstanding. 
Obtained via Compustat Annual data 
 Measured as difference in Current Year and prior year Dividend Per 
Share scaled by and prior year Dividend Per Share 
 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 If the Dividends Growth was greater 
than 0% 
stayed the same over the past year for a firm Dummy variable with a value of 1 when dividend growth in a given year is 
0% 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 when firm pays a cash dividend  
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Table 3.3 Independent Variable Definitions and Data Source 
This table presents an overview of the Independent variables used in our research.  It is divided into three 
categories which focus on CEO incentivization, CEO characteristics, and firm specific characteristics. Delta 
and Vega are based on data from Coles et al., (2006) and Core & Guay (2002) which has been made available 
to the public for select firms from 1993-2016. Using CORPEROL and GVKEY, we use both Compustat and 
Execucomp to find pertinent annual data on CEO and firm.   
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition Source 
 
 
Incentivization 
metrics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEO 
Characteristics 
Delta The change in value (in thousands of dollars)  associated with CEO wealth for a 
1% change in stock price return. Scaled by firm assets (in millions) 
Coles et al (2006) 
Core & Guay (2002) 
Vega The change in value (in thousands of dollars) associated with CEO wealth for a 
1% change in annualized stock return volatility.  Scaled by firm assets (in 
millions) 
Coles et al (2006) 
Core & Guay (2002) 
Ln (Delta) The natural log of the value of Delta Coles et al (2006) 
Core & Guay (2002) 
Ln (Vega) The natural log of the value of Vega Coles et al (2006) 
Core & Guay (2002) 
High Volatility Dummy variable in which firms with highest quartile of cash flow volatility are 
assigned a value of 1 
Compustat   
(Dichev & Tang, 2008; 
Jayaraman, 2008) 
Volatility  Continuous variable which is based on monthly earnings over the past 5 years Compustat  
(Dichev & Tang, 2008; 
Jayaraman, 2008) 
High Volatility*Vega High Volatility variable interacted with Vega measurement Compustat 
Volatility*Vega Volatility variable interacted with Vega measurement Compustat 
Tenure Natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has held the title of CEO at 
that specific firm. Calculated as the difference between the year of the 
observation and the year in which the executive assumed the role of CEO 
Execucomp 
( Demarzo & Duffie, 
1995) 
New CEO Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if CEO is in his or her first three years of 
new role 
Execucomp 
(Berger et al., 1997) 
CEO Interlock Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if CEO is involved in a relationship 
requiring disclosure pertaining to compensation 
Execucomp 
(Berger et al., 1997) 
CEO Gender Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if CEO is female Execucomp  () 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Size A 3 year rolling average of the natural logarithm of Total assets Compustat  
(Miller & Rock, 1985) 
Profitability A 3 year rolling average of Net Income scaled by Total Assets  Compustat (Fama & 
French, 2002) 
Leverage A 3 year rolling average of Total long term debt scaled by Total Assets Compustat 
(Crutchley and 
Hansen, 1989) 
Capital Expenditures A 3 year rolling of Capital Expenditures less sale of PPE scaled by Total Assets Compustat 
(Bulan & 
Subramanian, 2008) 
Cash on Hand A 3 year rolling Average of Cash and Short Term Investments scaled by Total 
Assets 
Compustat 
(Opler et al., 1999) 
Sales Growth The current periods sales scaled by the previous year’s sales level Compustat (Bradley 
et al., 1992) 
M/B Market Value of Equity scaled by Book value of equity Compustat  (Fama & 
French, 2002) 
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Table 3.4 Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of the major independent variables. The negative values of profitability have been verified to be 
accurate, in addition to the negative capital expenditures which can be attributed to a sale of PP&E. The low number of Interlock agreements and 
female CEOs has been verified. Additionally, the units in which the data was measured is available in column (7). All variables have been 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES N Mean S.D Min Max Units p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
Delta 16,330 0.680 2.283 0 98.57 T/M 0.020 0.052 0.153 0.469 1.414 
Vega 16,330 0.075 0.155 0 8.453 T/M 0.001 0.011 0.035 0.089 0.178 
Ln (Delta) 16,330 12.217 1.735 0 20.003 Logarithmic 10.301 11.254 12.223 13.249 14.219 
Ln (Vega) 16,330 9.898 3.329 0 16.099 Logarithmic 7.097 9.457 10.694 11.760 12.660 
High Volatility 16,330 0.249 0.433 0 1 Binary 0 0 0 1 1 
Volatility 16,330 0.016 0.017 0.001 0.474 % 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.019 0.032 
Tenure 16,312 2.306 1.258 0 4.745 Logarithmic 0.693 1.386 2.197 3.135 4.263 
New CEO 16,312 0.208 0.406 0 1 Binary 0 0 0 0 1 
Interlock 16,330 0.039 0.192 0 1 Binary 0 0 0 0 0 
CEO Gender 16,330 0.001 16.89 0 619.5 Binary 0 0 0 0 0 
Size 16,279 20.89 1.608 15.53 27.40 Logarithmic 18.94 19.75 20.72 21.88 23.09 
Profitability 16,279 0.036 0.126 -2.832 1.477 M/M -0.050 0.016 0.051 0.087 0.126 
Leverage 16,279 0.209 0.183 0 3.218 M/M 0.000 0.058 0.190 0.314 0.425 
Capital Expenditures 16,329 0.064 0.060 -0.470 0.766 M/M 0.015 0.027 0.047 0.079 0.129 
Cash on Hand 16,279 0.154 0.169 0 0.945 M/M 0.012 0.0308 0.088 0.220 0.400 
Sales Growth 16,318 0.136 0.714 -1 58.09 % -0.115 -0.001 0.081 0.190 0.375 
M/B 16,330 2.063 1.954 0.352 82.47 % 0.992 1.202 1.583 2.290 3.500 
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Table 3.5 Pearson Correlation coefficients among Independent variables  
This table reports the Pearson correlations across the independent variables used in our regression analysis. The correlations are based on all 
observations in which data is not missing. Standard errors are excluded but may be provided upon request. All insignificant values are given 
coefficients of 0 with a * denoting significance in the difference from 0 at the 5% level.  
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DIVIDEND 
INCREASE 1               
       
CONSTANT 
DIVIDEND -0.685* 1                     
DIVIDEND ISSUER 
0.689* -0.904* 1                    
DIVIDEND PER 
SHARE 0.388* -0.421* 0.472* 1            
       
DIVIDEND 
GROWTH 0.104* -0.039* 0.025* 0.081* 1           
       
DELTA 
-0.071* 0.099* -0.103* -0.069* 0 1                 
VEGA 
-0.047* 0.064* -0.062* -0.037* 0 
0.031
* 
1                
LN(DELTA) 
0.127* -0.088* 0.114* 0.090* 0.017* 
0.320
* 
-
0.017
* 
1               
LN(VEGA) 
0.060* -0.035* 0.048* 0.050* 0 
-
0.143
* 
0  1              
VOLATILITY 
-0.043* 0.061* -0.059* -0.025* 0 
0.039
* 
0.143
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  1             
HIGH VOLATILITY 
-0.031* 0.047* -0.047* -0.018* 0 
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* 
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0.056* 
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CEO GENDER 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.028* 0 0 0 
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0 0.020* 1        
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0.315* -0.364* 0.389* 0.337* 0 
-
0.217
* 
-
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* 
0.385* 0.312* -0.046* -0.049* 
-
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0.058* 0 0 1       
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-
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-
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* 
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-
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0 0 
-
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-
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0.149
* 
-
0.055* 
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-
0.351
* 
-0.140* -0.363* -0.161* 1   
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0.062* 0 0 0 
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* 
0 0 0 
-
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* 
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1  
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0.029
* 
0.239* 0 0.040* 0.038* 
0.075
* 
-
0.023* 
0 0 
-
0.176
* 
-0.019* -0.112* 0.030* 
0.32
7* 
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Table 4.1 Dividend per Share Model 
 
In this regression table, we observe the coefficients of our independent variables against the 
dependent variable Dividend per Share (DPS). DPS is calculated using current year cash dividends 
paid scaled by shares outstanding. There are four iterations of our model which focus on different 
variables explaining dividend level, column (4) representing all variables included. Additionally, 
year and industry effects are accounted for. All values included are variable coefficients with 
respective robust standard error underneath in brackets.  
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CEO Incentivization CEO Charecteristics Firm Specific factors CEO & Firm 
Delta -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Vega -0.250*** -0.205*** -0.119*** -0.219*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.045) (0.075) 
Continuous Volatility    -0.528 
    (0.359) 
Volatility*Vega    3.452** 
    (1.625) 
Tenure  -0.067***  -0.037*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
New CEO  -0.064***  -0.032* 
  (0.019)  (0.018) 
CEO interlock  -0.054*  -0.047 
  (0.031)  (0.029) 
CEO Gender  0.061  0.076** 
  (0.040)  (0.038) 
Size   0.141*** 0.139*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
Profitability   0.464*** 0.465*** 
   (0.046) (0.046) 
Leverage   -0.089*** -0.083** 
   (0.033) (0.033) 
Capital Expenditures   -0.477*** -0.492*** 
   (0.092) (0.092) 
Cash on Hand   -0.175*** -0.153*** 
   (0.038) (0.038) 
Sales Growth   -0.023*** -0.022*** 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
M/B   0.021*** 0.022*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.129*** 0.427*** -2.732*** -2.524*** 
 (0.037) (0.047) (0.087) (0.093) 
Year and Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,330 16,312 16,266 16,248 
R2 0.019 0.026 0.132 0.135 
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Table 4.2 Dividend Growth Model 
In this regression table, we observe the coefficients of our independent variables against the 
dependent variable Dividend Growth (DG). Only the firms that increased their dividends are 
included in this model.LN(Delta) and LN(Vega) are the logarithmic values of the raw Delta and 
Vega proxies from Cole et al. (2013). The binary variable High Volatility replaces continuous 
volatility, indicating if a firm is in the highest quartile of earnings volatility. There are four 
iterations of our model which focus on different characteristics explaining dividend level, column 
(4) representing all variables included. Additionally, year and industry effects are accounted for. 
All values in table are variable coefficients with respective robust standard error underneath in 
brackets.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CEO Incentivization CEO Characteristics Firm Specific factors CEO & Firm 
Ln(Delta) 0.018*** 0.0180*** 0.004 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ln(Vega) -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
High Volatility Quartile    -0.092 
    (0.066) 
High volatility* Ln(Vega)    0.010* 
    (0.006) 
Tenure  0.028**  0.026** 
  (0.012)  (0.012) 
New CEO  0.029  0.022 
  (0.030)  (0.031) 
CEO interlock  0.012  0.002 
  (0.055)  (0.055) 
CEO Gender  0.027  0.008 
  (0.065)  (0.065) 
Size   0.025*** 0.0261*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Profitability   0.551*** 0.552*** 
   (0.173) (0.173) 
Leverage   0.135* 0.127* 
   (0.070) (0.070) 
Capital Expenditures   -0.197 -0.206 
   (0.189) (0.190) 
Cash on Hand   0.263*** 0.249*** 
   (0.091) (0.091) 
Sales Growth   -0.085* -0.089* 
   (0.051) (0.051) 
M/B   0.009 0.009 
   (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant -0.029 -0.153 -0.436*** -0.545*** 
 (0.106) (0.119) (0.153) (0.164) 
Year and Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,615 5,611 5,605 5,601 
R-squared 0.009 0.010 0.017 0.019 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3 Dividend Increases and Constant Dividend Model 
In this regression table, we find the coefficients of our independent variables that have been 
regressed against dependent variables that include Dividend Increases (1), Constant Dividends (2), 
Issuer vs. Non-Issuers (3). These binary values are tracked using GVKEY. All columns represent 
logit regressions. All values in table are variable coefficients with respective robust standard error 
underneath in brackets.  
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Dividend Increase Dividend Constant Issuers vs Non-Issuers 
Delta -0.015 0.023** -0.026* 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
Vega -0.751*** 1.009*** -1.043*** 
 (0.289) (0.270) (0.285) 
Continuous Volatility -2.865** 4.841*** -4.173*** 
 (1.436) (1.371) (1.441) 
Volatility*Vega 8.322 -7.256 8.133 
 (8.258) (8.060) (8.400) 
Tenure -0.225*** 0.315*** -0.314*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
New CEO -0.286*** 0.403*** -0.374*** 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.064) 
CEO interlock -0.228** 0.157 -0.220** 
 (0.105) (0.097) (0.103) 
CEO Gender 0.097 -0.091 0.187 
 (0.132) (0.129) (0.136) 
Size 0.377*** -0.403*** 0.485*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
Profitability 9.523*** -3.973*** 11.35*** 
 (0.380) (0.257) (0.375) 
Leverage -1.205*** 0.588*** -1.165*** 
 (0.131) (0.118) (0.128) 
Capital Expenditures -2.550*** 2.199*** -2.497*** 
 (0.344) (0.310) (0.328) 
Cash on Hand -3.297*** 4.016*** -4.656*** 
 (0.173) (0.153) (0.171) 
Sales Growth -0.748*** 0.767*** -1.069*** 
 (0.090) (0.078) (0.088) 
M/B -0.106*** -0.088*** -0.116*** 
 (0.021) (0.014) (0.021) 
Constant -7.622*** 7.032*** -8.688*** 
 (0.334) (0.330) (0.354) 
Year and Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,247 16,247 16,248 
Pseudo R2 0.1648 0.1890 0.2551 
